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RECENT DECISIONS

tees in the technical sense of the term, they occupy a fiduciary relation
to stockholders respecting corporate transactions, 12 and a relation of
trust to the corporation by being bound to exercise the strictest good.
faith in respect to its property and business.1 3 The Act 14 denies to
directors and officers the right to profit from short term dealings in
the securities of their corporation by requiring the filing of statements
of their security holdings in the company and further provides that
profits made from dealings in such securities within any period of less
than six months shall inure to the company. "The cases 15 upon
which the Commission relied do not establish principles of law and
equity which in themselves are sufficient to sustain its order," and I
believe it will be difficult for them to enforce a penalty by way of
limitation to cost upon the findings of a past transaction which has
been harmful to the public interest or the interest of investors. Both
subordination and the limitation to cost cases are cases 16 based on the
fiduciary relationship, and in each of the cases the claimant was a
stockholder. The leading subordination case is known as the Deep
Rock case. 17 There the parent claimant in a reorganization proceeding was to receive stock in the new company. The court held that
the parent's mismanagement, resulting in the subsidiary's insolvency,
required the subordination of the parent's claim to that of preferred
stockholders. This present decision eliminates any possibility of the
court connecting the Deep Rock doctrine with a limitation to cost
theory. The limitation to cost is a somewhat less drastic penalty than
subordination for a similar type of situation.
M. M. D.

CRI

INAL LAW-DOUBLE

JEoPADY.-Defendant-appellant was

convicted of violating a federal statute (12 U. S. C. A. § 588b) by
entering a national bank in Vermont with intent to utter a forged
'Heim v. Jones, 14 F. (2d) 29 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
Elliot v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 80 N. E. 450 (1907).
14 PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935, § 17 (a and b).
'15 Magruder v. Drury, 235 U. S. 106, 35 Sup. Ct. 77, 59 L. ed. 151 (1914);
Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503, 11 L. ed. 1076 (U. S. 1845). The Commission
applied an analogy to the latter case which dealt with specific obligations of
express trustees and in which case the following rule of equity is noted-"that
a purchase by a trustee or agent of the particular property of which he has the
sale, or in which he represents another, whether he has an interest in it or not
-per interpositam personam--carries fraud on the face of it" The Commission held here that even though the management does not hold the stock of the
corporation in trust for the stockholders, nevertheless the duty of fair dealing
which the management owes to the stockholders is violated if those in control
of the corporation purchase its stock, even at a fair price, openly and without
fraud.
16 Pepper v. Litton, 100 F. (2d) 830 (C. C. A. 4th), certiorarigranted,307
U. S. 620 (1939).
17 See Note, The "Deep Rock" Doctrine: A Realistic Approach t ParentSubsidiary Law (1942) 42 CoL. L. REv. 1124.
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promissory note and thereby to defraud the bank. A federal statute 1
makes it a federal offense to enter a national bank "with intent to
commit ...

any felony . . .".

The utterance of a forged promissory

note is a felony under the laws of Vermont 2 but not under any federal statute. Defendant was convicted below under the theory that
the word "felony" as used in the federal statute was meant to include
offenses which were felonies under state law. Held, conviction reversed because the word "felony" as used in § 2(a) of the statute
does not incorporate state law and the defendant's act was no felony
under any federal law. 3 Jerome v. United States, 63 Sup. Ct. 483
(1943).
One of the considerations involved in this decision is the principle
that the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment 4 does not
stand as a bar to federal prosecution, though a state conviction based
on the same acts has already been obtained. 5 In view of this fact,
Mr. Justice Douglas in his opinion states "that where Congress is
creating offenses which duplicate or build upon state law, courts
should be reluctant to expand the defined offenses beyond the clear
requirements of the terms of the statute." 6 The Fifth Amendment,
like all other guaranties in the first eight amendments to the Federal
Constitution, applies only to proceedings by the Federal Government.7 The same act may constitute an offense against both federal
and state laws and an acquittal or conviction in one jurisdiction will
not prevent prosecution in the other.8 In New York it was held 9
that the fact that the Federal Government made a certain act a crime
was no bar to that state from including the same act as a crime in its
Penal Law. The fact that it is entirely possible for a man to be punished twice for the same act, has been recognized by the courts 10 who
have expressed abhorrence at such a result, unless the cases contained
'BANK ROBBERY AcT, 48 STAT. 783, 50 STAT. 749, 12 U. S. C. § 588b,
12 U. S. C. A. § 588b, subd. 2a.
2 P. L. 1933, §§ 8485, 8750.
3 There is no common law offense against the United States. See United
States v. Gradwell, 243 U. S. 476, 485, 37 Sup. Ct. 407, 410, 61 L. ed. 857
(1917); United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 3 L. ed. 259 (U. S. 1812).
But even if there was, forgery at common law was only a misdemeanor. See
WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (12th ed.) 861.
4 ". . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; . . ." U. S. CoNST. AMEND. V.
5 Hebert v. State of Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 47 Sup. Ct. 103, 71 L. ed.
270, 218 A. L. R. 1102 (1926) ; United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 43 Sup.
Ct. 141, 67 L. ed. 314 (1922).
6 See princ ipal case, p. 486.
7 Brantley v. Georgia, 217 U. S. 284, 30 Sup. Ct. 514, 54 L. ed. 768 (1910);
Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 8 L. ed. 672 (U. S. 1833).
8Hebert v. State of Louisiana, cited s'upra note 5; United States v. Lanza,
cited supra note 5; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 12 L. ed. 213 (U. S. 1847).
9 People of the State of New York v. John Fury, 279 N. Y. 433, 18 N. E.
(2d) 650 (1939).
"See Fox v. Ohio, cited supra note 8; United States v. Palan, 167 Fed. 991
(1909); People ex rel. McMahon v. Westchester County, 1 Park. Cr. Rep. 659
(N. Y. 1852).
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such extraordinary facts as would warrant that result. The courts,
however, have stated that being punished twice for the same offense
is contrary to the fundamental concepts of the Bill of Rights, even
though there is no technical bar to prosecution by both federal and
state courts for the same act. In two cases where there was a double
conviction in this manner the court either suspended sentence or imposed only a nominal penalty. 11 It is evident, therefore, that when
the Court in Jerome v. United States, declined to construe a federal
criminal statute so as to include state felonies within its scope, and
gave as one of its reasons for so doing, the danger of double punishment for the same offense, it was following the principles enunciated
in the aforementioned cases 12 which uphold the spirit of the constitutional guaranty as to the prevention of double jeopardy.
L.Y.

FEDERAL EmPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACT-MASTER AND SERVANT-

AssumI'ioN OF RISK.-Death action brought under Federal Employer's Liability Act' by widow and administratrix of decedent, a
railroad policeman employed by respondent. The complaint alleged
negligence and failure to provide a reasonably safe place to work.
Decedent was standing between two narrowly separated tracks in the
respondent's unlighted switchyards on an exceedingly dark night, and
as he was using a flashlight to inspect the seals of a slowly moving
train, he was suddenly struck and killed by the rear car of a train
which was backing in the opposite direction on an adjoining track.
No warning by sound or light was conveyed to decedent.2 Motion
by defendant for a directed verdict on the ground that the evidence
disclosed no actionable negligence-was granted. Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed,3 holding that decedent had assumed the risk of his
position and that therefore no duty was owing to him by respondent.
On certioraribefore the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed
and remanded with directions. The 1939 amendment to the Federal
Employer's Act 4 obliterated every vestige of "assumption of risk"
11 United States v. Holt, 270 Fed. 639 (1921) ; cf. United States v. Palan,

cited supra note 10.
12 See note 10 supra.

145 U. S. C. § 51 et seq., 45 U. S. C. A. § 51 et seq. (1906), repassed with
alterations not material (1908), cited infra note 10.
2 Circuit Court found (128 F. [2d] 420, 422 [1942]) that it was "probable
that Tiller did not hear cars approaching" from behind him.
3 Id. at 420.
4 53 STAT. 1404, 45 U. S. C. § 54 (1939), "...
employees shall not be held
to have assumed the risks of employment in any case where such injury or
death resulted in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers,
agents, or employees of such carrier." See note 13 infra for provision in § 54

